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Abstract
This paper examines the implications of income redistribution on human cap-
ital accumulation and income inequality, presenting a model where human capital
investment is indivisible and agents diﬀer in economic opportunity as well as in-
tellectual ability. It is shown that the impact of redistribution is ambiguous on
the income distribution as well as on human capital accumulation. In particular,
while redistributive policy is likely to be successful both in terms of eﬃciency and
equity in low-tax societies, it may be highly detrimental in both respects if the
rate of redistribution is already moderate or high.
1. Introduction
The desirable degree of equality in the distribution of income and the eﬃciency and
equitableness of redistributive tax policy are indeed among the most delicate issues
on the economic-political agenda of the modern welfare state. The traditional view
that redistributive taxation entails a conﬂict between eﬃciency and equity typically
stems from the neo-classical analysis with complete markets and representative agents.
Nevertheless, this result has to some extent been invalidated in the modern analytical
framework, where it is allowed for market imperfections as well as individual diﬀerences.
Particularly, in recent work on accumulation and distribution in the absence of perfect
credit markets (e.g., Saint-Paul and Verdier [1993], Glomm and Ravikumar [1992],
Durlauf [1996], B´ enabou [1996], Perotti [1993], Loury [1981], Galor and Zeira [1993]),
it is stressed that if individuals are credit constrained, redistribution is conducive to
growth to the extent that it allocates resources more eﬃciently, but detrimental in the
sense that it distorts incentives for investment.In this paper, it is argued that while redistributive income taxation need not be
damaging to aggregate economic activity, neither does it necessarily give rise to a more
even distribution of income. Hence, redistributive taxation may not only be twice
beneﬁcial, but also twice detrimental in terms of eﬃciency and equity.
The paper introduces a simple model where individuals are diﬀerentiated by their
intellectual ability, or talent, as well as their economic opportunity. Human capital
investment is indivisible, thus requiring a minimum initial wealth, while the returns
to schooling depend on individual talent, hence making investment more attractive
to talented than to untalented agents. Further, income is taxed proportionally and
redistributed lump-sum. However, in addition to equalizing after-tax income, redis-
tributive taxation aﬀects individuals’ opportunities as well as their incentives to invest
in education, and thus alters both the pre-tax and the after-tax distribution of income.
Consequently, the implications of an increase in the rate of income redistribution are
uncertain on the level of per capita income as well as the degree of income inequality.
The analysis indicates, ﬁrstly, that redistributive taxation need not induce a trade-
oﬀbetween eﬃciency and equity, and secondly, that the eﬀ ects of increasing the rate
of redistribution are highly dependent on the initial tax burden of the economy. In
particular, while increases in the rate of redistributive taxation are quite likely to be
twice beneﬁcial, that is to enhance eﬃciency as well as equity, in low-tax societies,
increases in the tax rate may very well be twice harmful in high-tax societies. One
implication of these results is that class societies may arise in high-tax as well as in
low-tax economies, while another is that in some cases, gains in terms of equity as well
as eﬃciency might be achieved by lowering, rather than increasing the rate of income
taxation.
The paper is structured as follows. The next two sections outline the theoretical
model and its equilibrium properties. Section 4 analyzes the eﬀects of increasing the rate
of income redistribution on human capital investment and income inequality. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
22. The Model
2.1. Population, Preferences and Technology
Consider a one-sector economy with missing asset markets. The economy is popu-
lated by a constant-sized continuum of inﬁnitely-lived dynasties. Individuals live for
two periods in overlapping generations, and are diﬀerentiated within as well as across
generations by their initial wealth, ω, and their talent, ξ. An agent’s initial wealth is
bequeathed upon her by her parent, and can take on two levels, ω and ω, where ω>ω .
Further, an individual’s talent reﬂects her innate learning ability (cf Fershtman et al.




ρξ +( 1− ρ)ξ if ξ−1 = ξ
ρξ +( 1− ρ)ξ if ξ−1 = ξ
where E (ξ) and ξ−1 are the agent’s expected talent and her parent’s talent, respectively,






, where the endpoints refer to the cases where talent is completely
random and completely persistent, respectively.1 It follows that there are four types of
individuals, which are characterized by their talent on the one hand, and their initial
















, where α + β + ϕ + γ =1 .
In the ﬁrst period of their lives, agents either acquire human capital through edu-
cation or remain idle, while in the second period, they supply their labor inelastically
and give birth, allocating their income between consumption and bequests to their oﬀ-
spring. All agents have identical preferences, which are deﬁned over consumption, c,
and bequests to their descendants, b, and are formally represented as




1The concept of individual talent is typically related to intelligence, or IQ, the heritability of which
has been frequently debated in theoretical as well as empirical work (REFERENCES, JEcPersp).
Moreover, in empirical studies, IQ has been estimated as being dependent on genetic factors only (as
in xx [yy]), as well as entirely on social factors (as in yy [xx]). See Jencks [1972] for an overview and
discussion.
3where the discount factor λ falls below 1.2
Labor income, w, is a function of human capital, h. Moreover, human capital can
take on two levels, ￿ and 0, thus there are two levels of labor income, y and x, where
y ≡ f (￿), x ≡ f (0) and y>x . At the beginning of life, after the realization of their
talent, individuals decide whether to accumulate human capital byacquiring education
or to remain idle.3 There are two levels of education, e =0a n de = 1, the latter
requiring an investment of q.4 In turn, human capital is determined byindividual
talent as well as educational achievement, thus talented agents acquire ￿ with certainty
if they invest in education, and with probability π otherwise, while non-talented agents
acquire ￿ with probability µ if theyinvest in schooling, and not at all otherwise. 5 In






















where π ∈ (0,1), µ ∈ (0,1), π + µ<1a n dµ>πThe condition π + µ<1
implies that the expected return on formal education is higher to a talented than to
2In this context, the ”warm-glow” bequest motive typically yields similar implications as the in-
tertemporal case (cf Loury [1981]), where individuals care about future generations’ well-being, rather
than the size of bequests (cf Glomm and Ravikumar [1992] and Galor and Zeira [1993]). Particularly,
as the absence of credit markets prevents poor families from saving for their descendants’ education,
the basic results of the analysis (see Section 2 and 3) should be practically the same in in the inﬁnite-
horizon case as in the present framework.
3It can be shown that all results remain intact in the case where agents decide on their education
level knowing only their expected, but not their actual talent.
4In the case of human capital investment, the assumptions of credit constraints and non-convexity
are fairly reasonable. The reason is, ﬁrstly, that human capital is typically considered as poor collateral
for borrowing, and secondly, that most educational programs require a minimum investment or eﬀort
in terms of for example years of study or number of credits.
5For empirical evidence in favour of a positive relationship between earnings and intellectual ability,
see for example Behrman et al [1981]. Further, evidence in support of a positive eﬀect of schooling on
earnings is provided by Card [1998].
4a non-talented agent.6 Moreover, the condition µ>πimplies that there is a positive
signalling eﬀect of education, so that the probability of getting a high-income job is
higher for educated than for uneducated agents, regardless of individual talent.
Finally, there is a government, that taxes income proportionally at the rate τ and
redistributes the proceeds lump-sum. In what follows, z and τz represent the tax base
and the transfer per head, respectively.
2.2. The Individual’s Problem
In the ﬁrst period of life, each individual chooses whether to invest in education or
not, while in the second period she decides how much of her income to consume and







subject to the conditions
e ∈{ 0,1}
c1 = ω − eq





















In order to retain notational simplicity, it is convenient to deﬁne the following con-
stants.
Deﬁnition 1. Deﬁne the constants Θ ≡ θ
θ (1 − θ)





Solving the maximization problem yields three decision rules. The ﬁrst is that agents
bequeath a ﬁxed share of their after-tax income, thus b =( 1 −θ)[ (1− τ)w + τz].
Parental bequests are equivalent to children’s initial wealth endowments, thus in the
6This interpretation follows directly from the incentive compatibility constraint of talented and
non-talented agents, which is derived in the next sub-section.
5cases where parental labor income equals y and x, b is equivalent to ω and ω, respec-
tively. The second rule is that agents ﬁnd it worthwhile to acquire education only if the
expected utility of doing so exceeds the expected utility of remaining idle, that is if
(1 − τ)λΘ(1− π)(y − x) ≥ q if ξ = ξ
(1 − τ)λΘµ(y −x) ≥ q if ξ = ξ (2.1)




λΘµ(y−x) . In what follows, (2.1) is referred to as the incentive compatibility constraint
for talented and non-talented individuals, respectively. The incentive compatibility
constraint is slack in the case of zero taxation. The third rule is that agents can aﬀord
investment in education only if their initial wealth net of taxes is at least as high as the
education fee, that is if
(1 − θ)((1 −τ)y + τz) ≥ q if ω = ω
(1 − θ)((1 −τ)x + τz) ≥ q if ω = ω (2.2)




(1−θ)(z−x). Henceforth, (2.2) is referred to
as the participation constraint for rich and poor individuals, respectively. The partici-
pation constraint exists for two reasons, the ﬁrst being the absence of credit markets and
the second being the indivisibility of investment in schooling. Hence, unless the rate of
income redistribution is suﬃciently high, that is unless τ>
q−(1−θ)x
(1−θ)(z−x), the participation
constraint implies that education is not aﬀordable to poor individuals. However, the
participation constraint also indicates that in the case of excessive income equalization,
that is any case where τ>
(1−θ)y−q
(1−θ)(y−z), neither rich nor poor agents are wealthy enough
to invest in education.
The ﬁrst of the assumptions below implies that in the case of zero taxation, education
is aﬀordable to rich individuals only. Moreover, the ﬁrst part of the second assumption
implies that the tax rate at which education becomes unaﬀordable to the rich exceeds
the tax rate at which education becomes aﬀordable to the poor, and falls short of the
tax rate at which education becomes unaﬀordable to the poor. The second part of
the second assumption, in turn, implies that there exists an equilibrium in which all
individual types acquire education. Finally, the third assumption implies that the cost
6of investment is in excess of the expected utility of getting a low income with certainty
after having acquired education.
Assumption 1. Assume that (1 − θ)y>qand that q>(1 − θ)x.




(1−θ)(y−z) in any equilibrium where at least









λΘµ(y−x) in any equlibrium where only rich agents can
aﬀord education.
Assumption 3. Assume that q>λ Θx.
3. Equilibrium
The model generates four stationary equilibria, the existence of which is proved in
Appendix B.7 Henceforth, z refers to the tax base in the ﬁrst of the equilibria described
below.
3.1. Equilibrium 1
In the ﬁrst equilibrium, the rate of income redistribution is suﬃciently low not to destroy
individuals’ incentives to acquire education, but not high enough to make education af-
fordable to poor agents. Hence, in this equilibrium, all individuals prefer schooling to
remaining idle, but only those who are born rich can aﬀord its acquisition.8 The suﬃ-
cient and necessary condition for this equilibrium is τ<
q−(1−θ)x
(1−θ)(z−x), while the expected
7For individuals’ transition matrices and deﬁnitions and calculations of per capita income and
income inequality in each of the equilibria, see Appendix A.
8This equilibrium shares the properties of the case in Galor and Zeira [1993] to a large extent.
In particular, credit market imperfections and indivisibility of investment imply that poor agents are
excluded from the opportunity to invest in education, which in turn suggests that there may be an
eﬃciency case for income redistribution. However, while the steady state distribution of income is
determined by its initial shape in Galor and Zeira, it is time-independent in this context. The reason
is that in the present framework, human capital may be acquired not only through education, but also
by market luck, that is with probability π and 0 for talented and untalented agents, respectively.







E (σ1)=( 1− τ)
√
π(1−µ)(1−2ρµ+µ)(2ρπ−2ρ+2−π)
2(1−µ−ρ+ρµ+ρπ+πµ−2ρπµ) (y − x)
3.2. Equilibrium 2
In the second equilibrium, the rate of income redistribution is suﬃciently high to make
education aﬀordable to anyone, but not to distort any agent’s incentives to invest in
education. Thus, in this equilibrium all agents acquire schooling, regardless of their
talent and initial wealth. The suﬃcient and necessary conditions for this equilibrium
are
q−(1−θ)x
(1−θ)(z−x) ≤ τ ≤
λΘµ(y−x)−q
λΘµ(y−x) , while the expected per capita income and degree of










2 (y − x)
3.3. Equilibrium 3
In the third equilibrium, the rate of redistributive taxation is suﬃciently high to make
education aﬀordable to anyone, but also to destroy non-talented individuals’ incentives
to acquire schooling. Hence, in this equilibrium, only talented agents ﬁnd it worthwhile
to invest in education. The suﬃcient and necessary conditions for this equilibrium are
λΘµ(y−x)−q
λΘµ(y−x) ≤ τ ≤
λΘ(1−π)(y−x)−q
λΘ(1−π)(y−x) , while the expected per capita income and degree of







2 (1 − τ)(y − x)
83.4. Equilibrium 4
Finally, in the fourth equilibrium, the tax rate is high enough to discourage not only
non-talented, but also talented agents from acquisition of education. Consequently,
in this equilibrium all individuals choose to remain idle. The suﬃcient and necessary
condition for this equilibrium is τ ≥
λΘ(1−π)(y−x)−q
λΘ(1−π)(y−x) , while the expected per capita income










2 (y − x)
4. The Implications of Redistributive Income Taxation
In this section, we consider the eﬀects of increasing the rate of income redistribution.
Henceforth, τ0 and τ￿ refer to initial and current tax rates, respectively, while σ[τ]
refers to the degree of income inequality at the tax rate τ. According to the ﬁrst of
the deﬁnitions below, tax increases that induce agents to alter their educational choices
and thus cause the economy to jump from one equilibrium to another, are referred to
as non-marginal, while tax increases that leave individual allocations unaﬀected are
referred to as marginal. Moreover, according to the second deﬁnition, non-marginal tax
increases are classiﬁed as small, medium or large depending on the extent to which it
aﬀects individuals’ allocations.







λΘ(1−π)(y−x) .I fτ0 < ￿ τ and ￿ τ<τ ￿, where ￿ τ ∈{ τ∗,τ∗∗,τ∗∗∗}, then τ￿ − τ0 is a
non-marginal tax increase, while if τ0 and τ￿ both belong to one of the intervals [0,τ∗],
[τ∗,τ∗∗] or [τ∗∗,τ∗∗∗], then τ￿ −τ0 is a marginal tax increase.
Deﬁnition 3. A non-marginal tax increase is small if it causes the economy to jump
from equilibrium j to equilibrium j +1, medium if it causes the economy to jump from
9equilibrium j to equilibrium j +2 ,a n dlarge if it causes the economy to jump from
equilibrium j to equilibrium j +3 .
Note that any marginal increase in redistributive taxation causes inequality to de-
crease, but leaves per capita income unaﬀected. In what follows, the implications of
non-marginal tax increases are analyzed. The proofs of all propositions in this section
are gathered in Appendix C.
The proposition below establishes that if the economy is initially in an equilibrium
in which education is aﬀordable to anyone, an increase in the rate of redistribution
causes per capita income to fall, while if the economy is initially in an equilibrium in
which only rich agents can invest in education, the eﬀect of further redistribution on
per capita income is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of the tax increase.
Particularly, if the increase in the tax rate makes education aﬀordable to poor agents
without discouraging talented agents from undertaking investment, then redistribution
generates a rise in per capita income. However, if the tax rate increases to the extent
that all agents refrain from acquiring education, redistribution produces a decline in
per capita income.
Proposition 1. A non-marginal increase in the rate of redistributive taxation gener-
ates a rise in per capita income if τ0 <τ ∗ and τ￿ <τ ∗∗∗, and a decline otherwise.
An important implication of Proposition 1 is that income redistribution need not be
harmful to human capital accumulation, the reason being that redistributive taxation
generates two counter-acting eﬀects on agents’ investment decisions. The ﬁrst is the
facilitation eﬀect, according to which poor individuals are given the opportunityto
invest in education. This eﬀect stems from the assumptions of credit constraints and
non-convexities in human capital investment. The second is the distortion eﬀect,w h i c h
refers to the adverse implications of redistribution on individuals’ incentives to invest
in education. While the facilitation eﬀect is beneﬁcial to human capital accumulation
and per capita income, the distortion eﬀect is clearlyunfavorable.
Clearly, Proposition 1 indicates that the facilitation eﬀect is stronger than the distor-
tion eﬀect onlyin the presence of wealth constraints and for suﬃcientlysmall increases
10in taxation, that is if onlyrich individuals can aﬀord schooling and if redistribution
facilitates investment for the poor without destroying incentives for acquiring educa-
tion. However, if wealth constraints are absent, the distortion eﬀect is the strongest,
thus further redistribution merelyweakens incent ives to invest in schooling, which in
turn slows down aggregate economic activity. In other words, the facilitation eﬀect
dominates the distortion eﬀect in the case where a non-marginal tax increase causes
the economyto jump from equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 2 or 3, but not in anyother case
(see Figure 1 for an illustration). These implications are similar to those of B´ enabou
[1996] and Perotti [1993].9
τ 0 * τ
* * τ
* * * τ
Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4
Figure 1. The cases where a tax increase implies a rise in aggregate income.
Another implication of Proposition 1 is that the allocation of talent matters to
aggregate economic activity(cf Murphyet al. [1991], Fershtman et al. [1996] and
Hassler and Rodr´ iguez-Mora [2000]). In particular, per capita income seems to be higher
in equilibria where onlytalented individuals acquire education, than in equilibria where
onlyrich agents choose to do so, although the rate of income taxation is higher in the
former case. In other words, talented agents are more productive than rich agents.10
9See also Saint-Paul and Verdier [1993] and Fern´ andez and Rogerson [1996], who show theoretically
and empirically, respectively, that redistribution through public provision of education is beneﬁcial to
growth if individuals are diﬀerentiated by economic opportunity.
10In an alternative setting, an equilibriumin which all agents invest in schooling need not be the
most eﬃcient outcome. For instance, in Fershtman et al [1996], the demand for social status may
induce untalented and rich (type ϕ) agents to acquire education, thus increasing the supply of high-
skill labour and ”crowding out” talented and poor (type β) agents by weakening their incentives to
invest in schooling. In turn, as talented and poor agents are typically more productive than untalented
11The next proposition indicates that the eﬀect of a non-marginal tax increase on
after-tax income inequality depends on the degree of pre-tax income dispersion as well
as the degree of intergenerational persistence in talent. In particular, the proposition
establishes that if the pre-tax dispersion of income is narrow enough and if the degree
of heritability of talent is not too high, then redistribution of income generates a decline
in inequality if the increase in the tax rate is suﬃciently large to remove untalented, but
not talented individuals’incentives for investment in education, and a rise otherwise.




3. Then a non-marginal increase in the
rate of redistributive taxation, τ, generates a rise in inequality if τ∗∗ <τ ￿ <τ ∗∗∗, and
an ambiguous eﬀect on inequality otherwise.
An interesting implication of Proposition 2 is that redistribution clearly need not
produce a more equal income distribution. This is because redistribution gives rise to
two separate, and sometimes counter-acting, eﬀects on the distribution of income. The
ﬁrst eﬀect is the equalization eﬀect, which refers to the reduction of after-tax inequality
that is generated by redistributive taxation. The second is the allocation eﬀect,w h i c h
stems from the assumption of heterogeneity in individual talent and refers to the change
in the pre-tax income distribution that arises to the extent that redistribution induces
agents to alter their investment decisions. If the allocation eﬀect is positive and in
excess of the equalization eﬀect, inequality rises, rather than declines, in response to
income redistribution. Note that the wider is the dispersion of pre-tax income, the
more likely is the equalization eﬀect to oﬀset the allocation eﬀect.
Indeed, Proposition 2 implies that if incomes are not too widely dispersed and if
the degree of heritability is suﬃciently low, then the allocation eﬀect is larger than
the equalization eﬀect if the tax rate is raised to the extent that only talented agents
beneﬁt from investment in education. In other words, the allocation eﬀect dominates
the equalization eﬀect only in the case where a non-marginal tax increase causes the
and rich individuals, economic growth is discouraged.
12economy to jump from equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 2 (see Figure 2 for an illustration).
τ 0 * τ
* * τ
* * * τ
Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3 Eq. 4
Figure 2. The cases where a tax increase implies a rise in inequality.
Suppose that redistribution is considered eﬃcient to the extent that it increases
per capita income and equitable to the extent that it reduces income inequality.11
Then Proposition 1 and 2 imply that while redistributive income taxation need not be
ineﬃcient, neither is it necessarily equitable. In other words, there is no unambiguous
relationship, and particularly not a negative one, between the eﬀects of redistributive
policy on eﬃciency and equity. Further, Proposition 1 and 2 imply that the implications
of an increase in the rate of income redistribution depend on the initial rate of taxation
in the economy as well as the magnitude of the tax increase. The reason is, for one thing,
that the implications of redistribution are determined by the relationships between the
facilitation and distortion eﬀects on the one hand, and the allocation and equalization
eﬀects on the other, and for another, that the relative strength of these eﬀects seems to




3, that is the case analyzed in Proposition 2. Table 1 shows how inequality
and per capita income respond to non-marginal increases in the rate of redistribution,
depending on which of these eﬀects are in dominance. Furthermore, Figure 3 depicts the
consequences of non-marginal increases in the rate of redistributive taxation in terms of
eﬃciency and equity, depending on the initial tax rate and the size of the tax increase.
Facilitation eﬀect Distortion eﬀect
Allocation eﬀect σ ↑, Y ↑ σ ↑, Y ↓
Equalization eﬀect σ ↓, Y ↑ σ ↓, Y ↓
11It is easy to show that the results remain intact in the case where eﬃciency is measured as aggregate
income less the aggregate cost of education.
13Table 1.
Clearly, Figure 1 indicates that the eﬀects of a non-marginal tax increase are highly
dependent of the initial rate of taxation as well as the magnitude of the tax increase.
Consider ﬁrst the case where education is aﬀordable only to rich agents, that is the case
where the economy is in equilibrium 1. In this case, a small (non-marginal) increase
in the tax rate, that is an increase that causes the economy to jump to equilibrium
2, is conducive to equity as well as eﬃciency (cf the lower right corner of Figure 3).
Furthermore, a medium tax increase, that is an increase that causes the economy to
jump to equilibrium 3, seems to enhance eﬃciency at the expense of a decline in equity
(cf the upper right corner of Figure 3). Finally, a large tax increase, that is an increase
that causes the economy to jump to equilibrium 4, gives rise to declining eﬃciency
and rising equity (cf the lower left corner of Figure 3). Consider now the case where
education is aﬀordable to everyone, that is the case where the economy is in equilibrium
2, 3 and 4. If the economy is initially in equilibrium 2, a small increase in the tax rate,
that is an increase that causes the economy to jump to equilibrium 3, turns out to be
ineﬃcient as well as unequitable (cf the upper left corner of Figure 1). In any other
case, non-marginal tax increases give rise to declining eﬃciency and rising equity (cf
the lower left corner of Figure 3).
Äó
ÄY
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anyother case
Figure 3.
14It follows that the eﬀects of taxation are highly dependent of the initial rate of
taxation as well as the magnitude of the tax increase. In particular, a small non-
marginal tax increase is twice beneﬁcial in terms of eﬃciency and equity if the economy
is initially in equilibrium 1, but twice harmful if the economy is initially in equilibrium
2. Nevertheless, any other tax increase induces a trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency.
In turn, this result yields two additional implications. The ﬁrst is that the optimal
design of economic policy depends to a large extent on the initial state of the economy.
In particular, the appropriate response of policy to a highly unequal income distribution
should not necessarily be to increase the rate of redistributive taxation. In the case
where high income inequality is a consequence of lacking economic opportunity to invest
in education, as in equilibrium 1, a moderate increase in taxation clearly enhances equity
as well as eﬃciency. However, in the case where income inequality is due to lacking
intellectual ability to undertake investment, as in equilibrium 3, the optimal policy
response is apparently to cut, rather than increase the rate of taxation.
The second implication is that class societies may arise at high as well as low rates
of redistribution. We deﬁne a class society as an equilibrium where individuals are
diﬀerentiated by their level of education. Hence, class societies arise in equilibrium 1
and 3, that is when τ<τ ∗ and τ∗∗ <τ<τ ∗∗∗, respectively, but not in equilibrium 2
or 4, that is when τ∗ <τ<τ ∗∗ or τ>τ ∗∗∗. Thus, while a moderate tax increase in
equilibrium 1 eliminates the class society by facilitating investment for poor individuals,
larger increases in redistributive taxation might create even larger class diﬀerences by
destroying incentives to invest for the less talented.
It should be noted that the channel of redistribution is not particularly critical to
the results. Suppose that the proceeds from taxation is used to subsidize the education
fee, rather than to ﬁnance a lump-sum transfer. Under this policy, the equalization
eﬀect of redistribution turns out to be reversed in equilibria where only a fraction of the
population undertake investment in education. This eﬀect arises as all agents’ incomes
are subject to taxation, while only those who acquire schooling are entitled to the
subsidy. Thus, in equilibria in which the investment subsidy is either too small to make
15education aﬀordable to poor agents, or too large to make education attractive to non-
talented agents, that is equilibria in which either only rich individuals or only talented
individuals acquire schooling, redistributive taxation implies a transfer of resources
from the poor to the rich.12 Hence, as opposed to the case of lump-sum transfers, in
this case marginal tax increases in equilibrium 1 and 3 gives rise to increasing, rather
than decreasing income inequality. Recall that Proposition 2 establishes that income
inequality is higher in equilibrium 1 and 3 than in equilibrium 2 and 4 in the case of
proportional taxation with lump-sum transfers. Clearly, this result remains intact in
the present case, since the de-equalizing eﬀects of marginal tax increases in equilibrium
1 and 3 imply that inequality in these equilibria is even higher in the case of investment
subsidies than in the case of lump-sum transfers. It follows that replacing general
transfers by investment subsidies does not signiﬁcantly alter the eﬀects of redistributive
taxation on either per capita income or the distribution of income.13
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have shown, ﬁrstly, that redistributive taxation need not induce a trade-
oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity, and secondly, that the eﬀects of increasing the rate of
income redistribution are highly dependent on the initial tax burden of the economy. In
particular, while redistributive policy is likely to be beneﬁcial to society both in terms of
eﬃciency and equity in low-tax economies, it may be highly damaging in both respects
if the rate of redistribution is already moderate or high. Evidently, a variety of topics
remain to be analyzed within the present framework. On the empirical side, an obvious
ﬁrst step would be to confront the model with an appropriate data set. Particularly, it
would be interesting to estimate the real world cut-oﬀ tax rates, at which investment in
education is made aﬀordable to the poor, and at which individuals’ incentives to invest
12Note that in this case, transfering from the poor to the rich is equivalent to transfering from the
untalented to the talented.
13In contrast, B´ enabou [2001] argues that redistribution through investment subsidies reduces in-
equality more eﬃciently, that is with less distortions, than does redistribution through progressive
income taxation.
16are destroyed.
Furthermore, on the theoretical side, a promising extension would be to reconsider
the modelling of individual talent as well as the learning technology. Empirical evi-
dence typically indicates that talent, or learning ability, is determined by social as well
as genetic factors (cf Behrman et al [1981]). Yet, allowing social capital or family en-
vironment to inﬂuence talent in this framework would merely imply a smaller share of
poor but talented individuals and thus as weakening of the eﬃciency case for income
redistribution. Nevertheless, in combination with a more complex learning technology,
an alternative deﬁnition of talent would possibly be more useful. In particular, it would
be interesting to examine the eﬃciency and equitableness of redistributive tax policy
in the case where talent depends on both social and genetic endowments and where the
achievements of the most successful individuals trickle down on their peers through local
or aggregate human capital spillovers. However, these are topics for future research.
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Appendix A.




α ρ 01 −ρ 0
β πρ (1 − π)ρπ (1 − ρ)( 1 −π)(1−ρ)
ϕ µ(1 − ρ)( 1 − µ)(1− ρ) µρ (1 −µ)ρ
γ 01 − ρ 0 ρ
18Equilibrium 2
αβϕγ
α ρ 01 −ρ 0
β ρ 01 −ρ 0
ϕ µ(1 − ρ)( 1 − µ)(1− ρ) µρ (1 −µ)ρ
γ µ(1 − ρ)( 1 − µ)(1− ρ) µρ (1 −µ)ρ
Equilibrium 3
αβϕγ
α ρ 01 −ρ 0
β ρ 01 −ρ 0
ϕ 01 − ρ 0 ρ
γ 01 − ρ 0 ρ
Equilibrium 4
αβϕγ
α πρ (1 − π)ρπ (1 − ρ)( 1 −π)(1−ρ)
β πρ (1 − π)ρπ (1 − ρ)( 1 −π)(1−ρ)
ϕ 01 − ρ 0 ρ
γ 01 − ρ 0 ρ
Furthermore, the stationary distributions of agents in equilibrium 1, 2, 3 and 4 are






































Since the shares of individual types sum up to 1, per capita income is equivalent
to aggregate income. Thus, expected per capita income in each of the equilibria is
calculated as
E(Y 1)=αy + β (πy +( 1− π)x)+ϕ(µy +( 1− µ)x)+γx
E(Y 2)=( α + β)y +( ϕ + γ)(µy +( 1− µ)x)
E (Y3)=( α + β)y +( ϕ + γ)x
E (Y4)=( α + β)(πy+( 1−π)x)+( ϕ + γ)x
19Finally, realize that the expected degree of income inequality in equilibrium j, E(σj),
is deﬁned by the standard deviation of expected after-tax income. This implies that
the degree of income inequality in each of the equilibria is calculated as
E(σ1)=( 1 −τ)
￿
(α + βπ+ ϕµ)(y −E(Y 1))




(α + β +( ϕ + γ)µ)(y − E(Y 2))




(α + β)(y − E(Y 3))




(α + β)π(y −E(Y 4))
2 +( ( α + β)(1− π)+ϕ + γ)(x −E(Y 4))
2
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In this appendix, zj denotes the tax base in equilibrium j, where j =1 ,2,3,4. The
proposition below ensures the existence of equilibrium 4.
Proposition 3. The tax rate at which talented agents do not ﬁnd education worth-
while,
λΘ(1−π)(y−x)−q



































> Φy +( 1−Φ)x. We know that Φ <
1
2, hence the condition
is satisﬁed. This veriﬁes the proposition.
The existence of equilibrium2 is ensured by the second part of Assum ption 2.
Finally, note that Assumption 1 implies that
q−(1−θ)x
(1−θ)(z1−x) > 0 and that the condition





λΘµ(y−x) , and thus that equilibrium 1 and equilibrium
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Individual types choosing e=1
ϕ α,





Proof of Proposition 1. Consider ﬁrst the case where τ0 <τ ∗, that is the case
where the economy is initially in equilibrium 1. In the case where τ0 <τ ∗ and τ￿ <τ ∗∗,
that is the case where the economy jumps from equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 2, the
change in per capita income is positive if and only if
1
2 (1 − µ)
(2πµ−µ+π−1)ρ+(1−π)(1+µ)
(1−µ−ρ+ρµ+ρπ+πµ−2ρπµ) (y − x) > 0 (5.2)
Indeed, (5.2) is satisﬁed for all parameter values if its LHS is positive at its minimum,
that is if ρ<
(1−π)(1+µ)
1+µ−π−2πµ. In turn, this inequality holds by transitivity if its RHS exceeds
1, that is if
πµ
1+µ−π−2πµ > 0, which is clearly true. Thus Y2 − Y1 > 0. Further, in the
case where τ0 <τ ∗ and τ∗∗ <τ ￿ <τ ∗∗∗, that is the case where the economy jumps from
equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 3, the change in per capita income is positive if and only
if
(1−ρ)(1−µ−π)
2(1−µ−ρ+ρµ+ρπ+πµ−2ρπµ) (y − x) > 0
which is clearly true for any set of parameter values. Hence, it must hold that
Y3 − Y1 > 0.
21Finally, in the case where τ0 <τ ∗ and τ∗∗∗ <τ ￿, that is the case where the economy
jumps from equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 4, the change in per capita income is negative




(1−µ−ρ+ρµ+ρπ+πµ−2ρπµ) (y − x) < 0 (5.3)
Clearly, (5.3) is satisﬁed for all sets of parameter values if its LHS is negative at its
maximum, that is if ρ<
µ(2−π)
(3µ−1+π−2πµ). In turn, this condition holds by transitivity if its
RHS is in excess of 1, that is if
(1−π)(1−µ)
3µ−1+π−2πµ > 0, which is obviously true. It follows that
Y4 − Y1 < 0.
Consider now the case where τ0 >τ ∗, that is the case where the economy is initially
in equilibrium 2 or 3. In the case where τ∗ <τ 0 <τ ∗∗ and τ￿ <τ ∗∗∗, that is the
case where the economy jumps from equilibrium 2 to equilibrium 3, the change in per
capita income is negative if and only if −
1
2µ(y − x) < 0, which is clearly true. Hence,
Y3 − Y2 < 0. Furthermore, in the case where τ∗∗ <τ 0 <τ ∗∗∗ and τ∗∗∗ <τ ￿, that is the
case where the economy jumps from equilibrium 3 to equilibrium 4, the change in per
capita income is negative if and only if −
1
2 (1 −π)(y − x) < 0, which is indeed true,
thus Y4−Y3 < 0. Note that our proofs of Y2 >Y 3 and Y3 >Y 4 imply by transitivity that
as the economy jumps from equilibrium 2 to equilibrium 4, per capita income decreases,
thus Y4 − Y2 < 0. This veriﬁes the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. The change in income inequality between equilibrium
j and k, where j and k denote the initial and the current equilibrium, respectively, is
positive for all feasible τ by transitivity if σmin
k −σmax
j > 0, and negative if σmax
k −σmin
j <
0. Consider ﬁrst the case where τ￿ <τ ∗∗, that is the case where the economy jumps
from equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 2. In this case, the change in inequality is negative
for all τ if σmax
2 −σmin
1 < 0, that is if σ2 [τ∗]−σ1 [τ∗] < 0. Thus, σ2 −σ1 < 0 if andonly
if
1






(1−µ−ρ+ρµ+ρπ+πµ−2ρπµ) (y − x) < 0
which, in turn, is satisﬁed if and only if
￿




22Note that the LHS and RHS of (5.4) increases and decreases, respectively, in ρ. This
implies that a suﬃcient condition for (5.4) to be satisﬁed is that it holds for the lower
bound of ρ, which is equal to 1
2. Replacing 1
2 in (5.4) yields
2
√
π>(1 − µ + π)
￿
1+µ (5.5)
the RHS of which clearly decreases in µ. Thus, a suﬃcient condition for (5.5) to be
satisﬁed is that it holds for the upper bound of µ, which is equal to 1 − π. In turn,




2 − π, which is evidently true. It follows that
σ2 − σ1 < 0.
Consider now the case where τ∗∗ <τ ￿ <τ ∗∗∗, that is the case where the economy
jumps from equilibrium 1 or 2 to equilibrium 3. In the former case, the change in
inequality is positive for all τ if σmin
3 − σmax
1 < 0, that is if σ3 [τ∗∗∗] − σ1 [0] > 0. Thus,










1−µ−ρ+ρµ+ρπ+πµ−2ρπµ (y − x) (5.6)
Indeed, it follows from Assumption 3 that (5.6) is satisﬁed by transitivity if its RHS






Note that the LHS and RHS of (5.7) decreases and increases, respectively, in ρ.N o t e
also that the RHS of (5.7) is an increasing function of y. This implies that the lower is
ρ and the lower is
y
x, the more likely is a non-marginal tax increase to enhance income
inequality. Thus, (5.7) is satisﬁed for any parameter values if it holds for the upper
bound of ρ and
y








3 for ρ and 7
3 for
y
x in (5.7) yields
4(1− π)
￿
π(1 − µ)(3− µ)(π +2 )< 3(1− µ +2 π − πµ) (5.8)
23Clearly, the LHS and RHS of (5.8) decreases and increases, respectively, in µ. This
implies that a suﬃcient condition for (5.8) to be satisﬁed is that it holds for the lower
bound of µ, which is equal to π. Replacing π in (5.8) yields
3+3 π − 3π
2 − 4(1− π)
￿
π(1 − π)(3− π)(π +2 )> 0 (5.9)
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Figure 5.
It follows from the plot that the LHS of (5.9) exceeds zero for all feasible values of




3, and that σ3 − σ1 ≶ 0
otherwise.
Consider now the latter of the two cases where τ∗∗ <τ ￿ <τ ∗∗∗, that is the case
where the economy jumps from equilibrium 2 to equilibrium 3. In this case, the change
in inequality is positive for all τ if σmin
3 − σmax
2 > 0, that is if σ3 [τ∗∗∗] − σ2 [τ∗∗] > 0.
But since σ is a decreasing function of τ, it follows by transitivity from our proofs of
σ3 [τ∗∗∗] − σ1 [0] > 0a n dσ1 [τ∗] >σ 2 [τ∗] that σ3 [τ∗∗∗] >σ 2 [τ∗∗] or, in other words,
that σ3 − σ2 > 0.
Consider ﬁnally the case where τ￿ >τ ∗∗∗, that is the case where the economy jumps
from equilibrium 1, 2 or 3 to equilibrium 4. In the second of these cases, that is the case
where the economy is initially in equilibrium 2, the change in inequality is negative for
all τ if σmax
4 −σmin







2 (y −x) < 0 (5.10)
24But since τ∗∗ <τ ∗∗∗,( 5 .10) must hold by transitivity if it is satisﬁed in the case
where τ∗∗ = τ∗∗∗,t h a ti si f
￿
π(2 − π) <
￿
(1 − µ)(1+µ). Clearly, this condition is
satisﬁed if (1 −µ − π)(1+µ − π) > 0, which indeed holds. It follows that σ4−σ2 < 0.
Note ﬁnally that in the case where the economy jumps from equilibrium 1 to equilib-
rium 4, it follows by transitivity and our proofs of σ1 >σ 2 and σ2 >σ 4 that σ4−σ1 < 0.
Likewise, in the case where the economy jumps from equilibrium 3 to equilibrium 4, it
is implied by transitivity and our proofs of σ3 >σ 1 and σ1 >σ 4 that σ4 −σ3 < 0. This
veriﬁes the proposition.
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